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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
In Beach v. Beach,8 upon failure of a husband to pay temporary
alimony pursuant to court order, a contempt charge was 'brought against
him by the wife. The wife then filed her motion for an order requiring
the husband to pay the exepnses of the contempt litigation. It was held
that such contempt proceedings were civil and not criminal in nature;
that the wife was the aggrieved party and the real party in interest, not
the court; and that the counsel was acting for the wife and not the court.
Consequently, it was proper to require the husband to pay the costs of the
contempt litigation pursuant to Ohio Revised Code section 3105.14.
In Fletcher v. Coney Island, Inc.9 a Negro sought to enjoin the opera-
tor of an amusement park from denying its facilities to the Negro. The
Civil Rights Act, Ohio Revised Code sections 2901.25 et seq., provided
penalties and damages when a person was so denied unless for reasons
"applicable alike to all citizens and regardless of color or race." The court
held that this statute created a new right and provided exclusive remedies
and that in the absence of a statute enlarging equitable jurisdiction, -in-
junctive relief was beyond the power of court. "If the General Assem-
bly has provided a remedy for the enforcement of a specific new right a
court may not on its own initiative apply another remedy it deems
appropriate."'10
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EVIDENCE
Application of Rule Forbidding the Basing of One
Inference Upon Another
Hart v Charles J. Rogers Transp. Co.,' was a motorist's action for
injuries sustained when a forging allegedly dropped from a tractor-trailer
outfit which he was following on the highway and crashed through his
windshield. There was no direct testimony as to where the forging came
from. The plaintiff, therefore, was obliged to rely upon some facts and
inferences which he claimed were sufficient to present a jury question
as to the negligence of the defendant.2 The plaintiff recovered a verdict.
The court of appeals affirmed, 3 and the cause came before the Supreme
Court upon defendant's moion to certify the record. The sole question
presented was whether, as a matter of law, Rogers was entitled to final
judgment.
899 Ohio App. 428, 134 N.E.2d 162 (1955)
'165 Ohio St. 150, 134 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
"Id. at 154, 134 N.E.2d at 375.
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The court conceded that any liability of Rogers must be based on
inferences and that if those inferences were based entirely upon other
inferences unsupported by fact, no basis for liability was shown. The
court pointed out, however, that the traditional rule that an inference
upon an inference will not be permitted, is frequently misinterpreted and
misapplied; that an inference whch is based in part upon another infer-
ence and in part upon factual support is universally approved, provided
it is a reasonable conclusion for the jury to deduce. The weight of an
inference as well as the weight of an explanation offered to meet the in-
ference are usually matters for the determination of the jury and, in this
case, the court declined to rule, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff's evi-
dence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. The judgment of the
court of appeals was affirmed.
Privileged Communications Between Physician
And Patient
In Matter of Loewenthal's Peztzon,4 the relator, a practicing physi-
cian, invoked the original jurisdiction of the court of appeals for the pur-
pose of obtaining a writ of habeas corpus to release him from arrest on
a mittimus issued for contempt of a notary public, because of his refusal
to answer certain questions put to him during the course of a deposition
in a personal injury case then pending in the court of common pleas. In
that case, the plaintiff, for the purpose of perpetuating his own testimony,
gave his testimony, by deposition, on direct examination. In so doing,
he made public the nature and extent of his injuries, related what he
told his physician, Dr. Loewenthal, in regard thereto, and described the
treatment the physician admiustered. Thereafter, the defendant sub-
poenaed Dr. Loewenthal, intending to interrogate him as her witness by
way of deposition regarding plaintiff's injuries and his treatment thereof;
the purpose being to perpetuate the testimony of the physician. On
objection 'by counsel for plaintiff, the physician declined to testify on the
ground that his testimony would reveal confidential information and that
he did not have his patient's consent so to do. The witness was thereupon
placed under arrest for contempt in refusing to answer questions. The
court properly held that the plaintiff had waived the protection afforded
by the physician-patient privilege statute5 by voluntarily disclosing confi-
1164 Ohio St. 329, 130 N.E.2d 820 (1956).
'To relate the evidence offered and the inferences relied upon would unduly extend
the length of this comment.
'123 N.E.2d 39 (Ohio App. 1954).
' 134 N.E.2d 158 (Ohio App. 1956).
r OiIo REV. CODE § 2317.02.
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dential information which he might have kept secret. Therefore, the
application of the relator for a writ of habeaus corpus was denied and the
physician compelled to testify upon deposition at the instance of the de-
fendant.
The decision on this point is both logical and just. When the patient
himself makes public the details of his affliction, or gives his version of
what the physician said or did, he should not be permitted to insist that
the prohibition of the statute continues to exist as to his physician. The
privilege cannot be waived in part and retained in part. The patient
cannot remove the seal of secrecy from so much of the privileged matters
as militates for his advantage, and insist that it shall not be removed from
that which operates to the advantage of his adversary.
It should be noted, however, that the court carefully limited its de-
cision only to the right of the defendant to take the deposition of the
physician. It felt that it was not called upon to determine what effects, if
any, the waiver would have if the testimony of the physician was sought
or offered by the defendant at the trial.8 It may be said in passing, how-
ever, that the general rule is that once the privilege is waived, it is waived
for all purposes throughout the trial.7 If, therefore, -the patient causes
his own deposition to be taken and reveals therein matters plainly with-
in the protection of the privilege, he thereby waives the privilege. In
fact, it ceases to exist, and this is true whether the deposition is, or is not,
introduced in evidence at the trial.8 Moreover, if the patient, in her
answers to interrogatories, voluntarily discloses -her mental condition, she
waives the privilege.9 And where the plaintiff, in a personal injury ac-
tion, takes the deposition of 'his physician or elicits his testimony by in-
terrogatories but does not introduce the same in evidence at the trial,
he has waived his privilege and the defendant may himself introduce the
deposition or answers of the physician as evidence in hs behalf."0 The
8 The case was settled before trial.
"The examination of witnesses by deposition is itself a portion of the trial. Murray
v. Physical Culture Hotel, Inc., 258 App. Div. 334, 16 N.Y.S. 2d 978, aff'd, 17
N.Y.S. 2d 862 (4th Dep't 1939). See also Clifford v. Denver & Rio Grande R.R.,
188 N.Y. 349, 80 N.E. 1094 (1907)
8Blish v. Greet, 74 Ind. App. 469, 120 N.E. 606 (1918); Green v. M. Nirenberg
Sons, Inc., 166 Misc. 652, 3 N.Y.S. 2d 81 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
'Munzer v. Swedish American Line, 35 F. Supp. 493 (S.D. N.Y. 1940).
10 Clifford v. Denver & Rio Grande R.R., 188 N.Y. 349, 80 N.E. 1094 (1907)
The same rule has been applied to the attorney-client privilege. The deposition
of the attorney was taken but not used. Watson v. Watson, 104 Kan. 578, 180 Pac.
242 (1919)
Likewise, the incompetency of a witness under the Dead Man Statute was waived
by the adverse party s taking his deposition, whether it was used or not. Baker v.
Baker, 363 Mo. 318, 251 S.W 2d 31, 33 A.L.R. 2d 1431 (1952). See also Mc-
Clenahan v. Keyes, 188 Cal. 574, 206 Pac. 454 (1922)
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